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TOWARDS A POLITICAL THEORY
OF PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION
JOHN DENVIRt

I.

INTRODUCTION

To what extent can and should litigation be used to achieve social
reform?' The question is undoubtedly an important one. and, despite
numerous examples of successful public interest litigation,2 the conventional view reflected in the scholarly literature is both suspicious of the
propriety of court-initiated reform and skeptical of its chances for lasting success.3
Critics have generally faulted public interest litigation on one or

both of two grounds: (1) it is improper for judges to mandate social
reform in a democracy, and (2) courts, because of institutional limita-

tions and political vulnerability, are fated to see their reform efforts
frustrated in the middle or long term. To put the point starkly, I think
the critics wrong on both points. To correct these errors is more than

an exercise in academic swordplay because they have been uncon" Associate Professor of Law, University of San Francisco Law School.
1. This was the basic question considered in the Lawyers and Social Change seminar at USF Law School between 1972 and 1974, and the author wishes to thank the
students, public interest litigators and social scientists who participated in the seminar,
many of whose views are reflected in this paper.
2. Oft-cited examples are cases such as Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion statutes unconstitutional); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam)
(death penalty unconstitutional); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (sex discrimination); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (discriminatory hiring procedures); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (prejudgment garnishment); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (welfare residency requirements);
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (arrest procedures); Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533 (1964) (reapportionment); and Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
(de jure school desegregation).
3. Representative of the scholarly criticisms are A. BICKEL, THm LEAST DANGERous BRANCH (1962); A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS
(1970); L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958); H. WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS,
AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1961); Glazer, Towards an Imperial Judiciary?, 41 THE Punl-

LTC INTEREST 104 (1975). Of course, some commentators have been more sympathetic
with attempts to remedy social evils through the courts. See S. LAzARUS, THE GENTEEL
POPUJLISTS (1974); J. SAx, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT (1971); Deutsch, Neutrality,
Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections Between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REV. 169 (1968); Wright, Professor Bickel, The Scholarly Tradition,
and the Supreme Court, 84 HAav. L. REV. 769 (1971).
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sciously accepted by both judges and public interest litigators themselves,
and have thereby to some extent become self-fulfilling prophecies.
The charge that courts are fundamentally elitist and nondemocratic and, therefore, should always defer to the allegedly democratic
legislature reflects a basic misunderstanding of the actual working of
our political system. Critics tend to postulate what might unkindly be
termed a "high school civics course" model of American democracy.
This model both overestimates the responsiveness of our political system to popular control and underestimates the very real democratic
controls on the judiciary. Both these assumptions lead inevitably to a
rather crabbed view of the legitimacy of public interest litigation. An
analysis of the weaknesses of this model will be the focus of Section III
of this paper.
The belief that litigation is fated to be ineffective results from the
"scholar's perspective," an analytical focus that views all litigation
efforts through the prism of appellate reports. This method has two
basic shortcomings: first, it attempts to judge all litigation by means
of analysis of the very few cases that do reach the appellate level;
secondly, it looks only to formal rule changes and ignores the myriad
secondary uses of litigation. These secondary uses will be the primary
concern of Section II.
Much of what follows may appear to take a naively optimistic view
of litigation's potential as a tool of social reform. Most litigation efforts
have fallen short of their goals; 4 this paper's interest, however, is the
potential of public interest litigation, not a history of its past efficacy.
Litigation will never play the role it might in social reform efforts until
judges have a better understanding of the proper role of courts in a
democracy and lawyers a better sense of the possible uses to which litigation can be put.
II.
A.

THE IMPACT OF LITIGATION

The Secondary Uses of Litigation

To limit the study of the social impact of litigation to the narrow
rule changes reflected in appellate decisions is, of course, myopic.
Public interest litigation always takes place in a political context and,
therefore, when properly designed, will have an immediate and/or a
4. See, e.g., Schrag, Bleak House 1968: A Report on Consumer Test Litigation,
44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 115 (1969).
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First, and especially in the

short run, litigation creates pressures on bureaucratic administrators
that cause them to take actions that otherwise would not be taken.

Secondly, in the longer run, the facts and value judgments reflected
in court decisions help change the perceptions of what administrators,

legislators, judges, and the public believe to be proper or legitimate.
1. Litigation as a Countervailing Force

While most scholarly attention is paid to cases in which a court
rules a state statute to be unconstitutional, such as in the school deseg-

regation, death penalty, and abortion areas, numerically these cases are
in the vast minority. Most public interest litigation is aimed at the more
prosaic goal of attempting to force large, politically unresponsive

bureaucracies to follow the clear mandate of the law.0

These "law

enforcement" cases seldom reach the official reports since the legal vio-

lations involved are typically so egregious that the bureaucracy concerned does not wish to attempt to defend them in court. 7

Once we cease viewing bureaucracies as static organizational
charts and recognize that bureaucrats are self-interested individuals responding to conflicting institutional and political pressures, it is easy to

see how the legitimate interests of some politically powerless groups
5. It should be noted that any discussion of social impact necessarily implies some
concept of causation. This paper will lean on Robert Dahl's definition of "influence"
("A influences B to the extent that A changes B's behavior from what it would have
been," R. DAHL, MODERN POLITICAL ANALYSIS 19 (2d ed. 1970)) to determine when
litigation has "caused" a certain effect. This analysis, of course, still leaves the problem
of the possible existence of several potential "causes" for any one effect. For instance,
I will argue that the Brown decision has been a "cause" of a diminution of racial prejudice in the United States. Even if one agrees that there is less racial hostility, he or
she might plausibly argue that actually it was caused by several other factors (e.g., integration in the armed forces, growing black political power in the North, industrialization
in the South) and that Brown itself was merely an effect of these causes. The conceptual problem is insoluble since we cannot set up laboratory experiments to separate
out the individual effect of each possible cause. However, this problem can be safely
left to social scientists and philosophers. See S. WASBY, THE IMPACT OF THE U.S. SuPREME COURT (1970), especially chapter 2. For our purposes, it is not essential that
litigation be the sole cause of any effect so long as it is a substantial contributor. This
in turn can only be judged by looking at the social context in which the social change
took place to see if it is reasonable to believe that litigation "made a difference."
6. E.g., Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 393 U.S. 268 (1969); Norwalk CORE v.
Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968); Gautreaux v. Chicago
Housing Authority, 269 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969), af'd, 436 F.2d 306 (7th Cir.
1971); Western Addition Community Organization v. Weaver, 294 F. Supp. 433 (N.D.
Cal. 1968); Thomas v. Housing Authority, 282 F. Supp. 575 (E.D. Ark. 1967).
7. See Sparer, The Role of the Welfare Client's Lawyer, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 361,
374-77 (1965).
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inevitably are underweighted in the administrative decisionmaking
process.8 Access to the courts can provide a necessary counterforce.
For instance, Western Addition Community Organization v. Weaver"
involved the refusal of a local redevelopment agency to follow the clear
mandate of federal law to provide relocation for people displaced by
its projects and the refusal of the federal agency monitoring the local
agency to require compliance. Simply too much money and political
power were behind the project to permit enforcement of the displaced
persons' rights-until a federal judge said the law had to be obeyed.' 0
Litigation, or the potential of litigation, often is the only means
available to keep large bureaucracies responsive to the legitimate
demands of the public they were set up to serve. The following are
examples of how litigation can provide this necessary countervailing
force; of necessity, they only suggest the role litigation can play.'
a.

The DeterrenceFunction

One reason it is unfair to judge the impact of litigation by the
cases on appeal is that some cases need not even be filed because
the very potential of a court challenge will have an effect on an agency
decision. Bureaucracies instinctively attempt to shield themselves from
monitoring by other agencies such as the courts. Once the threat of
a court challenge is credible, the agency feels a significant pressure
against illegal action. Therefore, for each suit brought, there may be
several that need not be.
The reaction of corporate bureaucracies to the creation of a private
cause of action for employment discrimination under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 196411 provides an illustration. Employment discrimination had been illegal for most large corporations for over a
quarter of a century, due to state Fair Employment Practices Acts and
various executive orders applicable to government contractors. However, little progress had been made because of the weakness of the
remedies provided. 12 Title VIi's private cause of action with provision
8. See Denvir, Controlling Welfare Bureaucracy: A Dynamic Approach, 50
NOTRE DAME LAW. 457 (1975).
9. 294 F. Supp. 433 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
10. Id. For an interesting case study of the controversy in Western Addition Community Organization v. Weaver, see Waldhorn, Legal Intervention, in GOVERNMENT
LAWLESSNESS IN AmEracA 363 (T. Becker & V. Murray eds. 1971).
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-15 (1970).
12. See M. SOVERN, LEGAL REsTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT (1966).
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for back pay awards and attorneys' fees made a dramatic difference;
corporate bureaucracies found for the first time that it was less "costly"
to start to make equal employment opportunity a reality. 13
b. The Publicity and Fact-FindingFunctions
Critics sometimes complain that litigation is ineffectual because of
a disparity between the narrow rights recognized by the law and the
"real" social problems. Litigation often leads to paper victories in
which the lawsuit is a success but the social evil is essentially untouched.
This criticism, of course, is all too often true. For instance, the welfare advocate is forced to argue the technicalities of the Social Security Act, fully realizing that the true problems of his or her client are
deeply inbedded in the economic system and the values that it creates
in society.
Often, however, the true success of litigation need not be
measured by the narrow scope of legal relief claimed or by the technical
viability of the legal theory the suit is based upon since the very filing
of the action forces -disclosure of facts and heightens public awareness
of facts and creates a political dynamic with an effect far beyond that
of the lawsuit itself. Bureaucracies have an institutional bias toward
low visibility decisions which, despite their far-reaching effects, often
escape public notice. The filing of a lawsuit constitutes a "newsworthy" event, which provokes media coverage, which in turn focuses
public attention on actions that often are both morally and politically
indefensible.
For instance, litigation played a major role in forcing the Atomic
Energy Commission to make public information about the potential
environmental -hazards involved in its multi-billion dollar breeder
reactor program, a concern that the AEC bureaucracy had concealed
or ignored for years. The lawsuit, SIPI v. AEC,14 formally involved
only the narrow question of whether the AEC was required under the
National Environmental Quality Act of 196915 to file an "environmental impact statement" on its entire research and development program
for the breeder reactor rather than merely for each individual project.
However, the courts affirmative answer to this question forced disclo13. See Hill, The New JudicialPerspective of Employment Discrimination-Litigation Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 43 U. CoLo. L. REv. 243 (1972).
14. 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
15. 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332(C) (1973).
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sure of information that became the subject of heated discussion in the
scientific community with the end result of reopening public debate on
a formerly low visibility bureaucratic decision that literally could affect
the habitability of our country for centuries to come.16
17
The case of Diana v. California State Board of Education
provides another illustration of this point. California operates special
classes for educable mentally retarded students (EMR). Placement
in such a class is, in essence, an official judgment that the child is of
subnormal intelligence. In 1969, some Spanish-speaking parents complained to attorneys for California Rural Legal Assistance that their
children were not receiving a decent education in EMR classes. Investigation revealed that children from Spanish-speaking homes were
heavily overrepresented in these classes. Further investigation revealed the reason; not only was placement determined by the administration of culturally biased "intelligence" tests, but in most California
counties, the tests were administered to children from Spanish-speaking
homes only in English. A complaint was drafted and filed alleging that
this practice violated the student's "right to education," an intellectually
respectable but hardly overpowering legal theory.1 8 However, there
was never any need to reach the technical legal merits because once
the facts of the case were aired in the press, the State politically had
to agree not only to retest all the children affected in both English and
Spanish but also to take additional steps to reduce the testing procedure's cultural bias.
c. CreatingNew Forums
Public bureaucracies have demonstrated a frustrating tendency to
insulate themselves from public pressures, especially pressures from the
public that they are designed to serve.' 9 Litigation can often improve
the responsiveness of such agencies without entangling the court in
myriad substantive issues. Instead, the court merely requires the
agency to accept more input by creating new forums in which the public itself can present its views. For instance, in National Welfare Rights
Organizationv. Finch,20 the Department of Health, Education and Welfare was required to permit a welfare rights group to participate in its
16. See Commoner, Energy 11, THE NEw YoRKER Feb. 9, 1976, at 39, 47-48.
), complaint reproduced in
17. Civil No. - (N.D. Cal., filed
HARvARD

UNIvERSITY

CENTER FOR

LAW AND

EDUCATION

CLASSIFICATION

292 (1972).
18. See, however, the later case of Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974).

19. See Denvir, supra note 8, at 463-70.
20. 429 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1970).

MATERIALS
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administrative hearings to determine whether to terminate federal payments to state welfare systems that had allegedly violated the rights of
recipients under the Social Security Act. Up to that time, those most
affected by the states' illegal activities were without representation at
the hearings. Another example is the decision of now-Chief Justice
Burger in Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v.
FCC 1 to permit representatives of the black community in Jackson,
Mississippi, to challenge the franchise renewal of a local television
station on the ground of racial discrimination. Also, in Moss v. Civil
AeronauticsBoard,22 Congressman John Moss was permitted to participate as a representative of the public in a CAB rate increase proceeding
for airline fares.
Constitutional decisions, such as Goldberg v. Kelly, 3 that require
that notice be given and an evidentiary hearing be held prior to the
termination of government benefits, create new forums on the individual level. 24 It is a basic fact of modem life that a large number of
important decisions affecting individuals are made by bureaucracies,
and that these bureaucracies have a tendency to make a large number
of erroneous decisions merely through inefficiency. For instance, note
the United States Supreme Coures reference in Goldberg v. Kelly to
the "welfare bureaucracy's difficulties in reaching correct decisions on
eligibility." 215 Decisions such as Goldberg at least permit the agency
to correct an erroneous decision when the recipient is able to correct
the facts upon which the agency acted. Probably the very presence
of the mechanism for review makes administrators making eligibility
determinations more careful during their original review of the facts
and somewhat less likely to construe close cases against the recipient.
Even the notice requirements breed better administrative practice by
requiring that the caseworker state clearly the reason for the disqualification, thus enabling the worker to catch his or her own error before a
termination is made.
d. A Catalystto Legislative Action
Too often, litigation and legislation have been seen as competing
modes of reform, rather than as complementary approaches. Public
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
430 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
397 U.S. 254 (1970).
Gilhool, The Uses of Litigation, 50 PEABODY . EDuc. 120, 126 (1973).
397 U.S. at 264 n.12.
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interest litigators now recognize that they must be able to coordinate
both litigation and lobbying efforts if they hope to have any substantial
effect. While it is true that most well publicized public interest cases
have focused on overturning existing legislation, litigation often acts as
a necessary catalyst to legislative reform.
Congress's enactment of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which
contained extraordinarily strong preventive remedies to combat widespread racial discrimination in voting requirements in the South, was
in many ways a direct reaction to the failure of litigation efforts under
prior legislation. 26 The United States Supreme Court's decision in
South Carolina v. Katzenbach documents the Congress's frustration
with the experience of attempting to ensure voting equality in the South
by means of traditional lawsuits. Congress "found that case-by-case
litigation was inadequate to combat widespread and persistent discrimination in voting." 27 Therefore, Congress felt justified in enacting
extremely strong measures, including giving the United States Attorney
General in effect a veto over any local legislation in the South that concerned voting qualifications. Ineffective litigation spurred the Congress to the enactment of effective legislation.
While the constitutional theory conceived by public interest litigators in the hope of forcing states to equalize local school districts in
terms of financial capacity was eventually rejected by the Supreme
Court in San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez,28 litigation based
upon the theory still has had a powerful effect on school finance legislative reform. The publicity surrounding the litigation, the facts it
brought to public attention, the legitimacy given the theory by its acceptance by an influential state supreme court29 and the potential for litigation forced legislatures to re-evaluate their antiquated school finance
schemes. Once a legislature's attention focused on the problem,
pressures for reform provided their own momentum. For instance, in
the 1972-73 legislative year alone, eleven different states made basic
reforms in their school finance laws. 30
It is not always a simple case of legislatures reacting to the
pressure of litigation; often, once a court has made a basic value judg26. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
27. Id. at 328.
28. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
29. See Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
30. See Grubb, The FirstRound of Legislative Reforms in the Post-Serrano World,
38 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 459 (1974).
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ment, the legislative process can provide a comprehensive scheme to
implement that value judgment and thereby improve upon the court's
work. Legislative reaction to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.3 provides an example. Prior
to Sniadach, state creditor remedies quite routinely ignored the debtor's
interest. Sniadach basically held that fairness, as reflected in the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment, required that a debtor be
given an evidentiary hearing before his 'or her wages were garnished.
In reaction to Sniadach and its progeny,"2 state legislatures began to
redraft their creditor remedies, not only to provide the basic "opportunity to be heard" that Sniadach held to be constitutionally required,
but also to provide necessary safeguards for legitimate creditor
interests. 3
The complementary roles that the courts, the Congress, and the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare played in bringing
about desegregation of Southern school districts is another example of
the catalytic effect of court-initiated reform. For ten years after
Brown, federal courts struggled on a case-by-case basis with Southern
school districts' intransigence. Slowly the courts lost patience with the
South and, as Judge Wisdom puts it, "[1]ess and less . . . accepted
the question begging distinction between 'desegregation' and 'integration! as a sanctuary for school boards fleeing from their constitutional
duty to establish an integrated non-racial school system." 4 However,
actual progress was slow until Congress passed Title VI *of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964," which conditioned the receipt of federal funds
upon the operation of a nondiscriminatory system. When HEW looked
to means to implement the legislation, it not only possessed the important "power of the purse," but also could rely on the experience of ten
years of litigation in the area. In fact, to a large extent the HEW regulations and guidelines merely codified the solutions that the judiciary
had devised and supplemented them with an effective remedy; 36 when
the HEW guidelines went beyond the prior decisions, such as in outlaw31. 395U.S. 337 (1969).
32. E.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
33. Compare, for example, the California revised procedure for claim and delivery
of personal property, CAL. CIrv. PRo. §§ 511-16 (West Supp. 1976), with its antiquated
predecessor, which was struck down on due process grounds in Blair v. Pritchess, 5 Cal.
3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971).
34. United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 848 (5th Cir.
1966).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970).
36. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 80 et seq. (1974).
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big so-called "freedom-of-choice" plans, a Supreme Court decision
87
had the political effect of ratifying the administrative interpretation.
The result was spectacular. Even by the fall of 1968, only
eighteen percent of black children in Southern states attended predominantly white schools. Within two years, enforcement of the HEW
guidelines more than doubled that figure to thirty-nine percent while
the proportion of black children attending all-black schools dropped
from sixty-eight percent to fourteen percent. 38 None of this, of course,
means that truly equal educational opportunity has been attained for
blacks, nor need it blind us to the fact that the solutions to school segregation have led to new and difficult problems stemming from busing,
but if one measures success by comparing the present with the near
past rather than with an ideological model of perfection, it is realistic
to judge this attempt at social reform a success and to admit that the
courts played a significant role in bringing about that success.
e.

The Function of Delay

At -first glance, delay of a formally approved project may appear
a strange candidate for an example of the socially beneficial uses of
litigation. Joseph Sax cites delay as the principal function of litigation
in the environmental area. 39 Sax points out that within bureaucracies
a certain "insider's view" prevails, and, therefore, few, if any, outside
views are solicited during the planning process on the merits of a proposed project. All too often the result is the presentation to the public
of a bureaucratic fait accompli.
The filing of lawsuits performs at least two socially worthwhile
functions. First, it serves notice on the agency of the intensity of the
opposition to the project.4 ° Bureaucrats are acutely aware of potential
political repercussions and recognize that there is a qualitative difference between the opposition that is able to generate a few irate letters
and that which warrants the expenditure of the time and expense of
filing a lawsuit. Secondly, the delay resulting from a lawsuit provides
the necessary breathing space in which interested groups are able to
organize opposition on the political front. Note, however, that even
this short delay only takes place if a judge feels that there is sufficient
37.
38.
39.
40.

Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
N. GLAzER, A r
atw DIsCRIMINATON 81 (1975).
J. SAx, supra note 3, at 155.
See id. at 191.
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merit in the lawsuit to justify a preliminary injunction. Also, since most
applicable statutes in the environmental area look only to procedures,
not substantive decisions, the final decision on the merits of a proposed
project is always made in the political arena. If the project truly has
merit, it will still prevail despite the delay.
The litigation experience under the National Environmental Protection Act of 1969 (NEPA) 4 ' is illustrative. NEPA requires only that
the "environmental impact" of a proposed federal project be considered
in the planning process and provides no substantive control over the
federal agency's final decision. Therefore, a lawsuit can only hope to
require the federal agency to file an environmental impact statement
properly prepared under the law. Yet environmental groups have
brought many such lawsuits and federal courts have issued injunctions
requiring that work on federal projects be discontinued until the proper
environmental impact statement has been filed.41 Such delay may be
43
crucial in permitting the public's voice to be heard for the first time.
2. Courts and the Legitimation of Community Values
We often view political institutions, including coms, as passive
mechanisms that merely reflect the input of various interest groups and
perhaps unconsciously distort that input to some degree due to the dysfunctions endemic to bureaucratic administration. This view oversimplifies the reality. Courts, especially the United States Supreme Court,
not only reflect societal values, they also help shape our beliefs about
what is proper, our perceptions of what is fact, and our expectations
of what is to be.4 On most public issues, most people in our society
have unformed or ambivalent attitudes and tend to look toward authoritative sources, including the courts, to help them decide what their
beliefs should be. When people feel a strain between their own
behavior and an officially endorsed attitude, there is a tendency to
reduce the tension by attempting to bring the two into conformity;
often, this resolution comes about by conforming the behavior to the
41. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq. (1970).
42. E.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir.
1972); Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng'rs, 331 F. Supp. 925 (D.D.C.
1971); Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark.
1971); Wilderness Soc'y v. Hickel, 325 F. Supp. 422 (D.D.C. 1970).
43. Joseph Sax in his excellent book on environmental litigation cites numerous examples of situations in which the delay caused by litigation permitted poorly planned
projects to be abandoned or substantially modified. See J. SAx, supra note 3, at
175-211.
44. Cf. M. EDELmAN, PoLmcs AS SYMBOLIC ACTION 7 (1971).
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model prescribed by the authoritative source.", This educational function of court decisions is felt by claimant groups, the public at large,
and, paradoxically, even by the courts themselves.
a.

The Ways in Which ClaimantGroups Perceive
Litigationand Organization

It is often assumed that litigation inevitably undermines organization unless it is used in a purely defensive manner, such as defending
organizers who have been arrested. 46 Admittedly, ill-conceived litigation can hurt efforts at organization. However, in both the short and
long terms, properly structured litigation can complement organizational efforts.
In a narrow tactical sense, litigation can be used by the organizer
to show the potential claimant groups that he or she does have the
power to affect their lives. Organization does not arise spontaneously;
it is the result of carefully planned efforts of the few who are able to
convince the many that success is possible. Some organizers may
assume that every injustice and defeat in the long run aids organization
since eventually the poor will rebel against the cumulative effects of
injustice. History would seem to counsel otherwise. Hope is a necessary precondition to action; continued defeat breeds apathy. The
organized wish to know how to win, and litigation can provide quick
and clear victories.
When litigation has undermined organization, the proper message
has become distorted. Instead of showing the organized that the establishment can be defeated, thereby inciting other community efforts at
organization and pressure, the litigation has taught only the lesson that
the establishment can be defeated by lawyers. This proposition is not
only false, it also reinforces the basic apathy that organization attempts
to overcome. This result, however, is not a weakness of litigation itself,
but a misconception by certain attorneys of exactly what their proper
role should be in organizational attempts and a misconception by the
organized of the abilities of attorneys that encourages deference to
them.
In the longer run, litigation can also help alter the claimant group's
perception of itself and of the legitimacy of its demands. Courts are
45. See P. FREUND, ON LAW AND JUSTcE 40 (1968).

46. Cf. BriU, The Uses and Abuses of Legal Assistance, 31 THE PUBLIC INTEREST
38 (1973).
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able to legitimize the claims of certain groups-for instance, blacksand thereby to create expectations in both the group itself and the
larger society that those claims should and will be met. Such expectations can lead to organization on the part of the claimant group and
acquiescence on -thepart of the society at large that permits the fulfillment of those claims. 47
It may now be a truism that one of the most pernicious effects
of discrimination is the tendency of the victim to internalize the
demeaning
role model that the dominant groups in society assign to the
minority.4 1 The rejection of -this model by authoritative agencies, such
as the courts, can have important repercussions on how members of the
discriminated groups view themselves. 'For instance, segregation was
based on the assumption of black inferiority; the whole caste system
built on that assumption strove to maintain that inferiority as a psychological reality. The rejection of that assumption in Brown v. Board of
Educationhad a profound effect on blacks and led to a new awareness
that the "right to equality" was the "law of the land"; this belief contributed in large part to the freedom rides, the Selma March, and the
other manifestations of racial pride that we associate with the 1960's. 49
Brown v. Board of Education was, of course, not the sole cause
of this change in self-perception, but the importance of decisions such
as Brown is to some extent indicated by the fact that the United States
Supreme Court is the only governmental institution that American
blacks feel "cares" about racial equality.50
A similar phenomenon can be seen in the Welfare rights movement. Since the era of the Elizabethan poor laws, public assistance
has always operated as a means to discourage sloth as well as to permit
minimal subsistence to those unable to earn a living in the capitalist
market. Public assistance has always been viewed as a type of public
charity that stigmatizes the recipient as being in some sense morally
blameworthy for his or her poverty. This stereotype of the welfare
recipient has been internalized, not only by middle class critics of welfare programs, but also by the recipients themselves. One consequence had been that large numbers of poor persons eligible for public
assistance in this country never applied for benefits because they did
47. See S. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS 132-37 (1974).
48. See generally W. GIER & P. COBBS, BLACK RAGE (1968).
49. See S. ScHEINGOLD, supra note 47, at 132-33. The political repercussions of this
new self-image are still being felt.
50. See L. HARMs, THE ANGUISH OF CHANGE 230-33, 234 (1973).
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not wish to be considered on the "dole." In the mid-1960's, welfare
advocates began to speak of the "right to welfare." In a series of decisions the United States Supreme Court endorsed the existence of this
right by articulating a "statutory entitlement" to welfare benefits.5
Many factors besides litigation are responsible for the "welfare explosion,"52 but it is a demonstrable fact that in the late 1960's there
was a prodigious growth in the number of people applying for and receiving welfare in the United States, and that this increase cannot be
explained by a mere growth in the pool of those potentially "eligible."
The most persuasive explanation appears to be that large numbers of
people who previously were unwilling to apply for welfare then availed
themselves of this newly discovered "right.""8
b.

The Perceptionsof the Public

A corollary to the role that courts play in legitimizing the claims
of minority groups is the effect that courts have in shaping the perceptions of the public. Kenneth Dolbeare gives a striking example of how
this "halo" effect can operate. Shortly after the United States Supreme
Court decisions outlawed prayer in the public schools,t 4 a sample group
was asked their opinion on whether prayers should be allowed in the
schools. The large majority said they approved of prayers in the
schools. These same people were then told that the United States Supreme Court had recently held that prayers in the schools were illegal.
One-half of the supporters of prayers in the schools said they approved
of the decision.55
This same process can be seen in the dramatic change in racial
attitudes that has taken place in the last twenty years in our country.
Until 1954, segregation, with its assumption of racial inferiority, was
the basic public policy of a large section of our country and was favored
by large numbers of citizens in other parts of the country. Brown destroyed the legitimacy of segregation as an acceptable public policy and
51. See Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598 (1972); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S.
282 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309
(1968).
52. See generally F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR (1971) for a
controversial but insightful analysis of the politics of the period.
53. For a fuller discussion of the growth of welfare in the 1960's and 1970's, see
text accompanying notes 77-85 infra.
54. School Dist. of Abbington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
55. Dolbeare, The Supreme Court and the States: From Abstract Doctrinw to
Local Behavioral Conformity, in THE IMPACT OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 204-07 (T.
Becker &M. Freely eds., 2d ed. 1973).
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thereby influenced the social processes that resulted in citizens'
changed perceptions of the morality of segregation. By 1973, eightynine percent of whites questioned nationally stated they wanted equality for blacks and well over three out of four persons interviewed said
they "had long felt discrimination against blacks was 'morally
wrong.' "6 While this verbal affirmance of racial equality may not be
reflected in the actions of the white majority, it is a necessary precondition to any meaningful movement toward equality and marks a great
emotional distance from the period not long past when a large percentage of white Americans believed that inequality was the natural and
just consequence of black inferiority.
Statistical evidence has been developed to show that this change
in perception has led to a dramatic increase in the income and status
of at least some black Americans. For instance, between 1959 and
1972, the median income of black families with both husband -and wife
in the home rose from sixty-two percent of the white ,family median
to eighty-five percent. 57 Statistics such as these are not used to argue
that we have solved the problem of discrimination since obviously we
have not. But they do show that when class and socioeconomic factors
are held constant blacks increasingly are allowed to compete for jobs
on an equal basis with whites.
c. The Perceptionsof Courts
Lawrence Friedman has commented that "the history of the legal
system is the history of the demands made upon it.""8 While many
groups in the society may have interests that potentially could be furthered by judicial action, the institutional nature of the courts is to respond to those groups that press their claims most vigorously within the
legal system. Therefore, not only do court decisions have substantial
educational impact on other actors in the social drama, but litigation
changes the perceptions of the courts themselves.
The Brown decision did not come from the Supreme Court sua
sponte. It was the culmination of a long-term attack mounted on de
56. L. HARIus, supra note 50, at 234.
57. N. GLAzER, AFFmMATvE DisCRIMNATiON 41 (1975). For instance, in the
North and West, in 1971, the income for black families under the age of thirty-five in
which both husband and wife worked was actually 101% of that of similar white
families. Id.
58. Friedman, Some Historical Aspects of the Law and Social Change in the
United States, 1973, at 2 (unpublished paper in the Center for Law & Society, University
of California at Berkeley).
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jute discrimination by the NAACP.5" So too, the landmark decision
of Furman v. Georgia0 was in large part the result of a very sophisticated litigation strategy coordinated by attorneys connected with the
NAACP Legal Defense Fund. 61 A third example is the successful litigation strategy of welfare advocates that eventually resulted in the
United States Supreme Court's decision in King v. Smith 2 that welfare
recipients have a legal entitlement to welfare aid which states cannot
take away because of alleged immorality. 63 Without the purposeful litigation efforts of these groups, these landmark decisions would not
have been handed down.
Once courts do face an issue, there seems to be a self-generating
momentum that forces them beyond passive inquiry to greater reform.
Archibald Cox has commented that "[ojnce loosed, the idea of equality
is not easily cabined. ' 64 Certainly, the expansion of the equal protection clause in the past twenty-five years has been prodigious.
Compare, for instance, the state of the law of equal protection when
Tussman and tenBroek's seminal article appeared in 1949 with the developments reflected in the HarvardLaw Review's 1969 survey of equal
protection.6 5 Justice Holmes' reference to the equal protection clause as
"the usual last resort of constitutional arguments" is now remembered
with irony.66
Professor Blumrosen has documented a parallel evolution in the
concept of employment discrimination. 7 Blumrosen points out that
employment discrimination, until recently, was limited to "acts . . .
motivated by personal antipathy" toward a minority group member.
Naturally, this type of racial intent was very difficult to prove. However, through litigation in the area, the concept of employment discrim59. See L. MILLER, THE PETITIONERS (1966).
60. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
61. See Meltsner, Litigating Against the Death Penalty: The Strategy Behind
Furman, 82 YALE L.J. 1111 (1973).

However, Furman was not the last chapter in the

history of the death penalty litigation. See Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909 (1976).
62. 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
63. See Sparer, The Right to Welfare, in THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS 65 (N. Dorset
ed. 1971).
64. Cox, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human
Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91 (1966).
65. See Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protectionof the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV.
341 (1949); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HAv. L. Rav. 1065
(1969).
66. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
67. Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept
of Employment Discrimination,71 MACH. L. REv. 59 (1972).
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ination has evolved to mean any "conduct which has an adverse effect
on minority group members."" s Litigation forced courts to confront
the very real institutional barriers to equal employment opportunities
for blacks. The myth that it was a problem of individual discrimination
was replaced with the realization that it was an institutional problem.
Accordingly, courts have consistently interpreted the ambiguous language of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196469 to favor minority
employees in such areas as testings 0 seniority, 1 and employment
72
quotas.
Reform in one area of the law creates precedents that are potentially applicable in related areas. For instance, the Supreme Courts
experience with racial discrimination in employment was probably the
primary force in Gomillion v. Lightfoot,71 which struck down racially
drawn municipal boundaries that had effectively disenfranchised
blacks. Then, the Court's experience with election districting in Gomillion played a significant role in later reapportionment decisions that did
not involve race.74 Later, it was the reapportionment cases that the
Court relied upon in declaring voting a "fundamental right" in cases
invalidating state restrictions on the franchise.75
B.

The "Inevitable"Legislative Backlash

One commonly accepted criticism of the efficacy of litigation is its
supposed inability to effect truly basic reform. As Gary Bellow has
stated the argument: "The problem of unjust laws is almost invariably
a problem of distribution of political and economic power; the rules
merely reflect a series of choices made in response to these distributions. ' 76 Since lawyers, in their social role, are limited merely to enforcing the rules that reflect the political equilibrium, they will be unable to effect basic changes in society.
68. Id. at 67.
69. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-15 (1970).
70. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
71. Local 189, United Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir.
1969).
72. Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd en bane, 452 F.2d
327 (8th Cir. 1972).
73. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
74. E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Can, 369 U.S. 186
(1962).
75. See Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); Kramer v. Union Free
School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663 (1966).
76. Comment, The New PublicInterest Lawyers, 79 YALE L.J. 1069, 1077 (1970).
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In a very large sense, this critique is accurate; litigation alone will
never bring- about socialism, nor in a democracy should it. However,
the argument does not seem sympathetic to the fact that lawyers, and
the clients they represent, must deal with society on a more short-term
basis, and seems to underestimate the amount of "play" in the social
system, the institutional elasticity that permits litigation to encourage
the type of substantial reforms discussed above.
A more extreme form of this criticism assumes the inevitability
of a legislative or electoral "backlash" to any social reform achieved
through the courts. For instance, consider Lance Liebman's discussion
of the reaction to the legal victories of the welfare rights movement
in the 1965 to 1968 era:
Was not the improved position of the poor only an improved
ability to achieve results in the court of first instance-the bureaucracy and the judiciary? Was not appeal necessarily going to
be taken to the legislatures, the Congress, and even the process of
judicial selection? And if the poor had lawyers and organizers,
but did not vote or otherwise participate in politics, were they not
bound in the end to lose most of their gains and all their momentum, regardless of how much turbulence they could stir up? The
failure of the northern
poor to register, vote, and elect is a sad
77
story of the sixties.
Not doubting for a moment the justness of Liebman's belief that meaningful electoral power permits a more comprehensive type of social reform than does litigation alone, one still suspects that he underestimates
the potential of -litigation, especially since the welfare attorney and his
or her clients really do not have a choice between using litigation or
electoral power. It is the very absence of electoral power that creates
the need to rely on an alternative forum for social reform.
Harry Brill notes the same backlash phenomenon in the history
of the efforts of the lawyers at San Francisco Neighborhood Legal Assistance Foundation who challenged the welfare policies of the Reagan
administration in California in the late 1960's:
There were even instances when favorable decisions were enforced
but still yielded little or no net gains for the poor. Take, for example, the Foundation's very important and celebrated participation
in the defeat of the one-year residency requirement for welfare.
This "victory" along with other developments in California, triggered austerity measures by the legislative and executive branches.
Eligibility requirements were more vigorously enforced and tight77. Liebman, Book Review, 85 HRv. L. REv. 1682, 1689 (1972).
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ened to exclude many poor people who had formerly been eligible;
the new restrictions were so severe that, despite an increase in
unemployment, the total number collecting welfare in California
actually dropped. So the victory for the recently arrived poor in
California simply came at the expense of those poor who had lived
there longer.
The main office lawyers responsible for these welfare cases
had followed a plan of action that backfired. They had argued
that inundating the courts with class action suits was the best route
to achieving welfare reforms. The idea was to force a crisis situation that would prompt the legislature and governor to liberalize
welfare and provide more funds; the actual consequence was the
Curiously the lawyers had never considered this possiopposite.
bility.78
The analyses of Liebman and Brill share two common points.
First, they rely on logic rather than empirical data. Neither author presents any data to support his factual conclusion that litigation "yielded
little or no net gains for the poor" 79 or that the poor were "bound in
the end to lose most of their gains."' 0 Secondly, their arguments assume the existence of a static "poverty pie," an inelastic quantity of
funds that society has set aside for the poor, which is measured by what
society, through the bureaucracy, had allocated prior to the litigation.
It is assumed that litigation may be able to change the relative share
of the pie that various groups of poor may receive (e.g., Brill's belief
that an increase in the number of recipients means lower grants per
recipient), but that the amount of total resources is predetermined and
cannot be changed.
The statistics simply do not support the thesis of either Brill or
Liebman. For instance, consider the experience of AFDC, which
Liebman argues was subject to a backlash after 1968. In 1965, total
payments to AFDC recipients in the United States were approximately
1.6 billion dollars; in 1970, they had risen to 4.8 billion dollars, almost
three times as much. In 1965, there were approximately 4.4 million
AFDC recipients; in 1970, there were approximately 9.7 million. In
1965, the average grant per recipient had been thirty-three dollars; in
1970, it rose to fifty dollars.8 ' By any reasonable measure, the poverty
78. Brill, The Uses and Abuses of Legal Assistance, 31 THE PUBLIC INTEREST 38,
43-44 (1973) (emphasis in original).
79. Id. at 43.
80. Liebman, supranote 77, at 1689.
81. E. FRIED, A. RrLVN, C. SCHULTIZE & N. TEETERS, SETTING NATIONAL PIoRTIES 188 (1972) (Table 6-6).
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pie had expanded enormously. Nor has the backlash predicted by
Liebman set in against AFDC since 1970: the total federal outlays for
AFDC almost doubled between 1970 and 1975.82 Nor has the growth
of the AFDC program come at the expense of other poor people: the
total outlays of the federal government on programs for cash income
maintenance more than doubled between 1970 and 1975 (from fortyseven billion dollars to ninety-eight billion dollars) as did the size of
federal programs providing services to impoverished groups, such as
the Medicaid, Medicare, and food stamp programs (rising from fourteen billion dollars to thirty-three billion dollars). 83
The California experience is no more compatible with Brill's
analysis. In June of 1965, there were approximately 470,000 persons
receiving AFDC benefits in California.84 The total payments were approximately 20.4 million dollars. By 1969 (the year in which the
United States Supreme Court handed down the Shapiro v. Thompson
decision to which Brill refers), the total number of recipients had approximately doubled (856,000) as had the total payments (43.3 million dollars). This much Brill would likely grant. However, his analysis would lead one to believe that the "backlash" after that point would
reduce the number of recipients and the total payments. However, the
reverse is the fact; between 1969 and 1972, the poverty pie in California almost doubled again. By 1972, the total number of recipients receiving AFDC had risen to approximately 1.3 million and the total payments had risen to approximately eighty million dollars. Nor was the
continued increase in the number of recipients and the total payments
made at the expense of payments per recipient, since the average payment per recipient rose from approximately forty-three dollars per
month in 1965 to sixty-three dollars in 1972.11
82. B. BLECHMAN, E. GRAMLICH & R. HARTMAN, SETnNo NATIONAL PRIORITIES 168

(1974) (Table 7-2).
83. Id.
84. This figure excludes AFDC-U, a program that provides welfare to families
where one of the parents is unemployed and, therefore, is subject to fluctuations according to the economic situation. See note 85 infra.
85. The foregoing statistics are from the CAL. STATE DEP'T OF BENEFIT PAYMENTS,
PUBLIC WELFARE IN CALiFORNIA, a statistical series published monthly. However, it

should be noted that after 1972, there is a leveling off of welfare expenditures for AFDC
in California. The grant per person remained at approximately sixty-three dollars per
month in 1973 and 1974, and the total number of recipients dropped infinitesimally to
1.2 million, as did the total payments to approximately 75 million dollars. This may
well be the result of the natural limit of the pool of those eligible; everyone eligible was
receiving welfare and no further growth was possible.
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ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE LEGITIMACY OF LITIGATION

CourtsAre a "Deviant"Institutionin a Democracy
The classical objection to court-initiated reform has been that it
is inappropriate in a democracy because it results in the nondemocratically appointed courts disregarding and overruling the will of the
elected representatives of the people. Many eminent legal scholars
have made this point in various contexts, notably Learned Hand,8 6 Herbert Wechsler, and Alexander Bickel."' As Professor Bickel succinctly stated the point: "[Wlhen the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a legislative act . . . , it thwarts the will of representatives
of the actual people of the here and now; it exercises control, not in
behalf of the prevailing majority, but against it."8 9 It is this nondemocratic nature of judicial review that leads Bickel to refer to it as a "deviant institution in the American democracy." 90
Of course, this objection can only indict courts that overturn a legislative act on constitutional grounds; it has no bearing on the many
situations in which the court strikes down the bureaucratic interpretation of a legislative act. In fact, in these situations it would appear
that the courts are actually preventing the nondemocratic bureaucracy
91
from thwarting the expressed will of the elected legislature.
Even when limited to constitutional litigation, Bickel's view seems
specious. It appears to assume that any type of legal control other than
legislation is somehow "deviant." This seems little more than name
calling. Hand's reference to the Supreme Court as a "third legislative
chamber" whose judgments rest on nothing other than a "coup de
main,' 92 and Wechsler's characterization of the Court as a "naked
power organ" also seem to shed more emotional heat than analytic
light. 93 Certainly, it is late in the day to reconsider overruling Marbury v. Madison. As Supreme Court historian Robert McCloskey commented: "[JInsofar as the charge is that the nation was unwise to delegate this duty to the judges (or allow them to assume it), it may be
right, but it is also perilously near to irrelevance. For this amounts
A.

86.
87.
88.
89.

See note 3 supra.
See note 3 supra.
See note 3 supra.
A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 3, at 16-17.

90. Id. at 18.

91. See Waldhorn, Legal Intervention and Citizen Participationas Strategies for
Change in Public Serving Bureaucracies,in GOVERNMENT LAWLESSNESS IN AMERICA 363
(T. Becker & V. Murray eds. 1971).
92. L. HAND, supra note 3, at 42, 55.
93. H. WECHSLER, supra note 3, at 27.
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to saying that America was unwise to be the nation that it was."' 4 Judicial review is a well established part of our governmental system; to
speak of American democracy in terms of a parliamentary model is
simply to misdescribe the reality.
There are in fact several social tasks to which courts are better
suited than elected legislators. Bickel himself admits to the existence
of certain "issues of moral philosophy and political theory, which we
abstract from the common political process

. . .

because it would be

wrong to decide them merely by a count of noses, or by striking some
Bickel mentions procedural protection for criminal debargain."
fendants, but there are other areas where the democratic majority as
well as the minority might be better served by the decisions of a court
than by those of a legislature. Many constitutional restraints, such as
procedural due process, are based upon enduring societal values and
principles that the give and take and logrolling of the legislative process
tend to undervalue. Legislators are 'most concerned with immediate
economic and social goals and the most efficient manner of achieving
those goals. However, as Mr. Justice Stewart has pointed out, procedural due process is concerned with more than efficiency; it is concerned with fairness to the individual: "Procedural due process is not
intended to promote efficiency or accommodate all possible interests: it
is intended to protect the particular interests of the person whose possessions are about to be taken."9 6 Courts are better suited than legislatures
to consider the applicability of such principles precisely because they are
removed from the day-to-day logrolling of the legislative process. 7
One can also question exactly how "democratic?' the political process and the legislatures it spawns really are. Certainly, Bickel's image
seems unrealistically sanguine: "In the political process, groups sometimes lose out, but so long as the process is operational.

. .

and allows

majorities ultimately to work their will, no group that is prepared to
enter into the process and combine with others need remain permanently and completely out of power." 8 Were the quote not from such
94. R. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 17 (1960).
95. A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS, supra note 3, at

86.
96. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 91 n.22 (1972). See also Mr. Justice White's
comments in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972), that "the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency."
97. Cf. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards:
Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE UJ.221, 266-67 (1973).
98. A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS, supra note 3, at
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an eminent source, it would be difficult to take seriously. It is an
axiom of political science that highly organized, well financed interest
groups have political influence in our society completely out of proportion to their numbers. How can one compare the influence of groups
such as ITT and the AMA with that of felons, aliens, and the poor who
must compete without the benefit of money or organization? The position of the disfavored groups is even more unfair since they also have
to fight the inertia of the status quo in a society that has diffused power
to such an extent that almost any attempt at reform can be "vetoed"
by a hostile interest group. Is there any reason why courts should be
blind to the social reality that confronts them and treat American democracy as if it were still peopled by simple yeomen with equal financial and political power?
If Bickel overstates the case for the "democratic" political process,
he also seems to understate the very real democratic controls that confine the autonomy of the nonelected judiciary. Much of the scholarly
criticism seems to have been influenced by the clash during the New
Deal era between the Supreme Court and President Roosevelt over
New Deal legislation. The Court in the 1930's thwarted the will of
the dominant majority on several issues of social policy which led to
Roosevelt's plan to "pack" the Court. It seems clear that in this instance, the Court did go well beyond a legitimate role in shaping policy,
but this experience seems to be the exception and not the rule. Political scientist Robert Dahl claims that normally the Supreme Court is
kept closely in tune with the political philosophy of the dominant majority through the exercise of the appointment power by the popularly
elected president 09 Certainly, the Burger Court's decisions in the
areas of obscenity and criminal defendants' rights after President
Nixon's "law and order" campaign in 1968 support Dahl's thesis. 100
B.

Courts Are InstitutionallyIncapable of Making Sound Policy Decisions and Also Lack Effective Enforcement Powers

Critics have not only criticized the nondemocratic basis of judicial
review; they also have claimed that courts are incapable of making
sound policy and unable effectively to enforce policy once it is made.
99. R. DAHL, DmvsocRAcY N THE UNrrE STATES 237-41 (1976).
100. See, for instance, Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) and Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973), as examples of the "Nixon Court's" retreat
in the obscenity area; and Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) and Harris v. New

York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), as indicative of the retreat in the area of defendants' rights.
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Courts Are Too "Principle Bound" To Make Sound Policy

Herbert Wechsler argued that it is the essence of a court's function
to operate through the elaboration of "neutral principles." We permit
the legislature, which is subject to the popular will, to make ad hoc
policy decisions that conflict with pre-existing rules and principles, but
we expect consistency from judges because consistency to rule and
principle is the basis of their authority. Judges are obliged to be entirely principled. A principled decision is one that "rests on reasons
with respect to all issues in the case. . that in their generality and
their neutrality transcend any immediate result that is involved."10 1
However, it is this requirement of consistency with principle that causes
critics to claim that the courts are too blunt an instrument for the formulation of policy. Professor Bickel states the objection most articulately:
The process of the coherent, analytically warranted principled
declaration of general norms alone justifies the court's function, yet
it is at the same time a source of danger to the survival of the
institution in a society which, if driven to demand ultimate consistency, will find it in the practices of political democracy, not in
submission to the court's authority. 102
Or, as Bickel puts it in another context:
The lesson, rather, is that in dealing with problems of great
magnitude and pervasive ramifications, problems with complex
roots and unpredictably multiplying offshoots-in dealing with such
problems, the society is best allowed to develop its own strands out
of its tradition; it moves forward most effectively, perhaps, in empirical fashion, deploying its full tradition, in all its contradictions,
not merely one or another self-contained aspect of it, as it retreats
and advances, shifts and responds in accordance with experience,
and with pressures brought to bear by the political process. The
only abiding thing, as Brandeis liked to say, is change, and in those
broad realms of social policy where that is so, judicial supremacy,
we must conclude, is not possible. 10 3
First, it must be recognized that the requirement of complete neutrality is simply impossible to attain except in a platonic world where
different values never come into conflict. Judicial decisions in the real
101. H. WECHSLER, supra note 3, at 27.
102. A. BIcKEL, THE SUPREME CouRT AND THE IDEA OF PROGREss, supra note 3, at

96.

103. Id. at 175.
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world will always entail the choice between competing values, and
when values conflict (e.g., the "rights" of the defendant and "rights"
of society), courts must choose which value to favor. 04 We cannot
expect neutrality; we can demand decisions of "adequate generality."'1 5 The court should rest its decisions on principles that it is willing to apply in other situations rather than approach each case on an
ad hoc basis. If courts consistently ignore this requirement of generality, they run the risk of eventually undermining the basis of their authority.
However, "generality" does not require that courts apply every
principle without exception to every conceivable factual situation.
Such a requirement would eviscerate the judicial function. An important part of a court's work is to draw lines that limit the reach of principles enunciated in prior cases when those principles conflict with different values that arise in the present case. As Judge Skelly Wright
points out, the Wechsler-Bickel analysis puts the court in an unfair dilemma: if the court rests a decision upon an articulated principle, the
critics point to the outrageous consequences that principle would have
if applied in future cases and ignore the possibility of a later rational
limitation on the principle; if the court attempts to rule narrowly, the
critics accuse it of failing the test of neutrality.' 0 6 It is a classic "headswe-win; tails-you-lose" situation.
"Adequate generality," as Jan Deutsch points out, is only one of
the court's institutional needs; the court's authority also rests upon the
public's view of the court as responsive to its felt social needs.10 7 In
other words, the court's prestige and authority were undermined much
less by its allegedly "unneutral" decision in Brown v. Board of Education'0 8 than they would have been by a continued condonation of stateenforced racial discrimination.
(2)

Courts Lack the Necessary Expertise To Make Effective
Policy

Courts are said to lack the necessary expertise to make sophisticated policy judgments. Bickel is suspicious of the qualifications of
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Deutsch, supranote 3, at 216.
Id. at 193.
Wright, supra note 3, at 777.
Deutsch, supra note 3, at 216.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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judges in this area: "One may wonder how effective, how good and
how acceptable to society such decision making by judges-generalists,
necessarily less well informed than they might be by their episodic interventions-will prove; this is a question I mean to raise."'1 9
One answer to this problem is that, in many areas, the "comparative qualifications" of judges are superior to those of the officials of
the agency whose actions they are monitoring." 0 Questions of fairness
of various procedures in welfare"' and prison systems" 2 are determinations in which the expertise of judges certainly seems superior to that
of the administrator, involved in the day-to-day operation of the program, who is subject to many pressures that militate against fairness.
Moreover, normally, the points of contention involved in public
interest litigation do not concern questions that require technical legal
expertise, but policy questions that the bureaucracy all too often evaluates as political questions, and rules not on the technical merits but according to the "political weight" of the conflicting views." 3 It is this
latter sort of question that the bureaucracy seems incapable of handling
objectively but that a disinterested judge, who is not subject to the
political pressures from a "clientele," can evaluate dispassionately.
When it is necessary to consider technical questions, courts can defend
their capability by relying on a long history of deciding such questions
in traditional lawsuits concerning medical malpractice, private nuisance,
products liability and patent litigation.
(3)

Courts Are Incapable of Enforcing Their Judgments
Courts are also said to be unable -toenforce a judgment effectively
once it is made. This weakness is normally attributed to the crudeness
of the injunction remedy and its dependence on the contempt sanction
that courts are loathe to use against public officials.
First, it should be noted that most often there is no "enforcement"
problem since courts act negatively rather than affirmatively; they
strike down rules rather than order action that must be monitored.
109. A.
107.
110.
111.
112.
113.

BiCKEL, THE SUPREmE CouRT AND THE IDEA oF PRoGREss,

See K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 30.06 (1972).
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
J.SAx, supra note 3, at 212.
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Shapiro v. Thompson 14 is a good example of this point. In Shapiro
the United States Supreme Court declared durational residency requirements for welfare eligibility to be unconstitutional. Furman v.
Georgia," , wherein the death penalty was declared unconstitutional,
is another example of a negative action.
Even when an affirmative remedy must be fashioned by the court,
the argument based upon the crudeness of the injunction power seems
overstated. First, it is based in essence on an assumption that the defendant will resist compliance with the court's order. Certainly, sometimes there is such resistance, but such cases are rare. Our whole legal
system is based upon voluntary compliance, and normally defendants
do obey court orders. Even in the few cases in which they refuse to
comply voluntarily, courts are not without flexibility in fashioning effective remedies, as case studies of school desegregation and employment
discrimination litigation have shown. 16 For instance, the court can retain jurisdiction and then appoint a master to implement the order or
a committee of interested parties to monitor the defendants' progress.1 17 In sum, a hallmark of litigation is its flexibility." 8 When a
judge is ready -torequire strict compliance with an injunction, he or
she has the necessary tools available to achieve compliance.
IV.

THE ROLE OF PUBLIC INTEREST
LITIGATION IN A DEMOCRACY

Both critics and supporters of public interest litigation have tended
to accept what has been termed a high school civics course model of
American democracy. This model portrays a system of great balance
and symmetry: the public feeds its views into the political system
through the ballot box to legislators who reflect the majority's value
choices in the legislative directions that they give to administrative
agencies, which in turn implement these choices through even-handed
administration of public services to the citizenry, which can, of course,
114. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
115. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
116. 0. F ss, INJuNcroNs 415-76 (1972) (case history of Montgomery school desegregation litigation); Gould, The Seattle Building Trades Order: The First Comprehensive Relief Against Employment Discrimination in the Construction Industry, 26
STAN. L. Rnv. 773 (1974).
117. See Harris, The Title VII Administrator: A Case Study in Judicial Flexibility,
60 CORNELL L. Rnv. 53 (1974); Note, The Wyatt Case: Implementation of a Judicial
Decree OrderingInstitutional Change, 84 YALE L.J. 1338 (1975).
118. See l. SAx, supra note 3, at 227-28.
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correct any malfunctioning of the system by merely issuing new directions to the legislators in the next election. It is not surprising that
acceptance of this model leaves little need for an activist judiciary.
The problem, of course, is that the model has a very tenuous connection with reality as we know it; the reality is what social scientists
Peter Marris and Martin Rein have termed a "breakdown of effective
democratic government."'"" The reality is not a system in which the
citizen is master, but in which he or she is all too often victim. The
citizen's voice on policy questions is almost never heard. It is drowned
out in elections by the multitude of issues that are presented in advertising agency simplifications. It is ignored in the legislature where it
cannot compete against well organized and well financed lobbying efforts of special interest groups. It is powerless within the administrative agency which is directed toward its own bureaucratic goals and interprets any citizen input as a violation of its "technical expertise."
The one political institution that is open to citizen complaints and
that is institutionally capable of demanding a response from the administrative machinery is the court. Courts are open to all citizens, and
a complaint, once filed, requires an answer. A motion for a preliminary injunction requires the bureaucracy to respond and to justify its
action or inaction before a judge, an impartial arbiter who shares neither the agency's "insider perspective" nor its vulnerability to political
pressure.
Litigation can and should play a major role in the American democracy. Since in reality it is the political system's only point of access
to the individual citizen, it in many ways has a greater claim to a democratic base than either its legislative or administrative governmental
counterparts. Once judges recognize the legitimacy of this function
and litigators better grasp the many uses to which litigation can be put,
the role of litigation should become even greater in working towards
a more just society.
119. P. AIpUUs & M. REN, THE DmEIfmAs op SocLiL REFORM 274 (2d ed. 1972).
The analysis in this section depends heavily on the epilogue in Marris and Rein's important book on social reform in the United States.

